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Constitutions and other legal frameworks are expected to ensure 
the protection of the fundamental and collective rights of citizens. 
In this respect, the regulation of political parties is a global 
phenomenon, which symbolises multi-party democracy, the rule 
of law and good governance. This article examines the 
phenomenon of the constitutional and legal regulation of political 
parties in the Central African Republic (hereafter CAR) and 
Senegal, two francophone countries with different trajectories 
and experiences of multi-party democracy. It identifies possible 
challenges and shortcomings of the regulation of political parties 
in the two countries, especially in relation to the actual 
implementation of the existing national frameworks. The article 
attempts to suggest possible frameworks for an effective 
implementation of the constitutional and legal rights of political 
parties, including the constitutionalisation of the enforcement 
mechanisms, which would undeniably protect the position of 
political parties in constitutional democracies. In conclusion, the 
article highlights the role of an independent judiciary in the 
promotion and protection of the constitutional and legal status of 
all political parties in the CAR and Senegal. 
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1 Introduction  
In democratic societies, party regulation is used as a mechanism to promote 
and guarantee citizens' rights to political participation but also to ensure that 
political parties' activities and behaviour comply with the goals and practices 
of modern democracies.1 Constitutions and other legal frameworks are 
expected to ensure the protection of the fundamental and collective rights 
of citizens. In this context, the contractual and other relationships between 
individual citizens and various communities should not be subjected to 
governments' direct interference.2 Citizens should enjoy a fundamental right 
to form any private association within the law, without state intervention.3 
Political parties, however, seem to occupy a specific position with regard to 
state non-interference, since on the one hand they are merely citizens' 
associations, while on the other hand they also aim to gain access to 
political power. This makes them major stakeholders in the sphere of 
national public policy and constitutional life. The constitutionalisation of 
political parties is a global phenomenon which symbolises multi-party 
democracy, the rule of law and good governance. In addition, many 
countries have also enacted laws which relate to the status and operations 
of political parties, including electoral laws, party finance and party formation 
regulations. Party constitutionalisation would set the principles to be 
followed by ordinary laws and provides stability to the legal status of political 
parties. As constitutions and laws provide for the rights and duties of political 
parties, it is imperative to examine how such provisions promote political 
parties which are expected to propose views and programmes alternative 
to those of the ruling party and therefore might be potentially vulnerable to 
pressure and intimidation. This article will review the phenomenon of the 
constitutional and legal regulation of political parties in the Central African 
Republic (hereafter CAR) and Senegal - two francophone countries with 
different trajectories and experiences of multi-party democracy - and its 
possible impact on the promotion of constitutional democracy. In its 2018 
interactive map of Freedom in the World,4 the Freedom House ranked 
                                            
  Sonia Vohito-Anyanwu. LLB (Lyon 3) LLM (Paris-Sud) LLD (UP). Faculty of Law, 
University of Pretoria, South Africa. E-mail: u15380752@tuks.co.za. Many thanks to 
the two anonymous reviewers for their helpful recommendations. 
1  Avnon 1995 JLS 296. 
2  Karvonen "Legislation on Political Parties" 2-4. 
3  Karvonen "Legislation on Political Parties" 2-4. 
4  Freedom House 2019 https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-
world-2018. 
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Senegal among the "free" countries in the world.5 In contrast, the CAR - a 
country in a conflict situation - was ranked amongst one of the few "least 
free" countries in the world.6 In this regard, one of the article's primary aims 
is to examine the process of party regulation in two African countries with 
similar colonial experience but with typically different political and 
democratic paths and experiences.  
This article aims to specifically focus on a comparison of their experiences 
of party regulation in promoting constitutional democracy and to establish 
whether the differences in political trajectories impact on their manner and 
level of political party regulation. The article lays out the theoretical 
approaches that will be used to inform the comparative analysis of 
constitutional democracy and party regulation in the two countries. The 
article will review key international and regional instruments regulating the 
rights of political parties and their impacts on the promotion of constitutional 
democracy in African states. It will conduct a critical analysis of the evolution 
of party regulation in the two selected countries prior to the wave of 
democratisation, i.e. from before the 1990s until now, and will identify 
possible challenges to and shortcomings in the regulation of political parties 
in the two countries. Finally, the article will attempt to suggest possible 
mechanisms for an effective implementation of the constitutional and legal 
rights of political parties, which will undeniably impact on the position of 
political parties in the constitutional order in the CAR and Senegal.  
2 Constitutional democracy 
The concept of constitutional democracy has been defined as a system of 
government based on popular sovereignty in which the structures, powers 
and limits of government are determined by a constitution.7 Constitutional 
democracy means that the power of the political authority is defined and 
regulated by the constitution so that the rights of individuals and minorities 
are respected.8 Constitutional democracy is notably characterised by the 
principle of popular sovereignty, in which citizens are seen as the ultimate 
                                            
5  Senegal’s rating was: freedom: 2/7; political rights: 2/7; civil liberties: 2/7 (1= most 
free, 7= least free). Freedom House 2018 https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-
world/2018/senegal. 
6  CAR’s rating was freedom: 7/7; political rights: 7/7; civil liberties: 7/7. Freedom 
House 2018 https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2018/central-african-
republic. 
7  Dallas Learning Cloud date unknown https://dlc.dcccd.edu/usgov1-1/the-meaning-
of-democracy. 
8  Centre for Civic Education date unknown http://www.civiced.org/resources/publica 
tions/resource-materials/390-constitutional-democracy. 
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source of the authority of the government, while in return the government 
holds its right to govern from their consent.9 In other words, in a 
constitutional democracy the expected primary goal of the government is to 
protect peoples' basic civil and political rights, including the right to freedom 
of association and assembly,10 the right to freedom to participate in 
government,11 citizen's right to equality and rights,12 as well as other 
economic and social rights pertaining to property, work, health and 
education. For instance, in the case of United Democratic Movement v 
Speaker of the National Assembly in 2017, the South African Constitutional 
Court defined a constitutional democracy as a "government of the people, 
by the people and for the people through the instrumentality of the 
Constitution".13 The Court added that "central to this vision [of constitutional 
democracy], is the improvement of the quality of life of all citizens and the 
optimisation of the potential of each through good governance".14 
Accountability, the rule of law and the supremacy of the South African 
Constitution are therefore core value of a constitutional democracy.15 
The advent of constitutional democracy in most African states took place in 
the early 1990s during what was called the "third wave of 
democratization".16 African states then were forced to embrace democratic 
and liberal values, especially as they faced increasing pressure from an 
empowered civil society and endeavoured to meet international financial 
institutions' loan conditions17 pertaining to good governance, civil society 
empowerment and constitutionalism. African states adopted new or revised 
constitutions, which entrenched democratic principles such as "political 
                                            
9  Centre for Civic Education date unknown http://www.civiced.org/resources/publica 
tions/resource-materials/390-constitutional-democracy. 
10  Articles 10 and 11 of the African Charter on Human and People's Rights (1981) 
(hereinafter the ACHPR). 
11  Article 13 of the ACHPR. 
12  Article 19 of the ACHPR. 
13  United Democratic Movement v Speaker of the National Assembly 2017 5 SA 300 
(CC) para 80. 
14  United Democratic Movement v Speaker of the National Assembly 2017 5 SA 300 
(CC) para 80. 
15  See ss 1(c) and (d) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 
(hereinafter the South African Constitution). 
16  A concept developed by Samuel P Huntington in relation to the global democratic 
transition, the first two waves began in the 1820s and the 1940s (Huntington Third 
Wave 366). 
17  Limpach and Michaelowa Impact of World Bank and IMF Programs on 
Democratization 7. 
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alternation",18 transparent democratic practices, and the reinforcement of 
political rights, as well as political competition.19  
Prior to the wave of democratisation in Africa, from the colonial period until 
the early 1990s, African states' experiences of constitutional democracy and 
multi-party democracy were mostly inconsistent.20 Most post-independence 
constitutions raised hopes with the inclusion or at least the non-prohibition 
of multi-party systems. However, the widespread constitutionalisation of 
one-party systems that followed in the late 1960s marked a grim period for 
democracy and constitutionalism, mostly across sub-Saharan African 
states. From the mid-1960s until the early 1990s, with the exception of 
Botswana, Mauritius and Gambia for a certain period, one-party systems 
became the norm on almost the entire African continent.21 In the early 
1990s, with the end of the Cold War and in the context of global economic 
crises such as the oil crisis and economic depressions, African authoritarian 
states had to adopt structural adjustment policies and political reforms. This 
process culminated in the African third wave of democratisation in the 1990s 
where African states started recognising multi-partyism and gradually 
amended their constitutions to reflect the transition to constitutional 
democracy.22 Most post-1990s African constitutions entrenched the 
principle of multi-party elections and recognised the rights to freely form and 
join political parties. Multi-party politics has since become the norm in Africa 
to such an extent that scholars have highlighted the "routinisation of 
multiparty elections".23 Almost all African states now conduct regular 
elections, which allow opposition parties to be represented in Parliament.24 
The entrenchment of multi-party systems in a constitutional democracy was 
mostly illustrated by the constitutional and/or legal regulation of political 
parties. There is a distinction between party constitutional regulation and 
party legal regulation.25 Party legal regulation refers to laws that govern the 
definition, composition, structure and activities of political parties.26 A mere 
                                            
18  Nicolas van de Walle refers to the absence of political alternation when the winning 
party in the first multi-party election almost invariably wins a more comfortable 
majority during the second elections. See Van de Walle 2003 J Mod Afr Stud 301. 
19  Fombad 2014 AHRLJ 416. 
20  Fombad 2015 VRÜ 6. 
21  Fombad 2015 VRÜ 7. 
22  For instance, the following countries adopted a new constitution after 1990: CAR 
(1995); Democratic Republic of Congo (Constitution amended in 1990 and 1994); 
Mali (1992); Ethiopia (1994); South Africa (1994 interim Constitution and 1996 
Constitution). 
23  Van de Walle 2003 J Mod Afr Stud 299. 
24  With the exception of Swaziland and Eritrea. 
25  Borz 2016 IPSR 2. 
26  Janda "How Nations Govern Political Parties" 1-12. 
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legal regulation of political parties could therefore lead to the enactment of 
legislation that protects the interests of dominant parties in the government 
or in the legislature and privileges their own positions.27 To the contrary, 
constitutional regulation of political parties means that specific provisions on 
political parties are enshrined in a constitution. The effect of this is that the 
constitutional provisions concerning political parties can be reviewed only 
through a clearly laid down procedure28 to ensure the protection of the will 
of the people. Party constitutionalisation provides evidence that political 
parties are recognised as "necessary institutions of the political system".29  
Momentum towards the regulation of political parties, particularly the 
constitutional regulation, gained pace in Europe in the period following 
World War II.30 Italy and Germany were the first countries in the world to 
give a constitutional status to political parties, and the practice gradually 
spread to other parts of Europe through the process of constitutional 
revisions. In Africa the rights of political parties were entrenched in 
constitutions in order to give political parties constitutional privileges and 
protection against all forms of authoritarianism and arbitrariness. Party 
constitutionalisation became the expression of pluralism, popular will, 
sovereignty, equality, participation and competition.31 
3 Constitutional and legal party regulation in CAR and 
Senegal: historical perspectives  
This section critically analyses the major phases of party constitutional and 
legal regulation in the CAR and Senegal from these countries' 
independence to the period of democratisation in the 1990s. Although both 
the CAR and Senegal are former French colonies, they are characterised 
by their unique historical and socio-political backgrounds and legal systems. 
Currently, Senegal is considered as a multi-party constitutional democracy 
characterised by multi-party elections, political competitiveness and political 
alternation,32 while the CAR's experience of constitutional democracy and 
political alternation has proven to be more turbulent and uncertain. 
Sectarian and religious tensions and violent armed groups, all leading to a 
serious humanitarian crisis, currently affect the CAR. The leadership of the 
                                            
27  Gauja Political Parties and Elections cited in Borz 2016 IPSR 2. 
28  Fombad 2007 Am J Comp L 21.  
29  Borz 2016 IPSR 2. 
30  Van Biezen 2009 http://www.partylaw.leidenuniv.nl/uploads/wp0309a.pdf 1. 
31  Borz 2016 IPSR 6. 
32  Freedom House 2019 https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2019/ 
senegal. 
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two selected countries should also be regarded as a significant factor in 
their political and democratic trajectories. In Senegal the first president, 
Leopold Sédar Senghor, played a critical role in the country's political path 
during the period leading to its independence. A poet and cultural theorist, 
he served as president for 20 years but resigned before the end of his fifth 
term in 1980.33 It is argued that Senghor's personality and credentials 
contributed to Senegal's current political stability and maturity. In the CAR, 
by contrast, although nationalist leader Barthélemy Boganda34 successfully 
negotiated the country's independence from France, his premature death 
seems to have had an impact on the country's political stability to date. 
Unlike Senegal, the CAR did not have an influential figure that embodied 
national unity, reconciliation and patriotism. It may be argued that the 
political unpreparedness of the nascent country, coupled with the vacuum 
left by Barthélemy Boganda's untimely death, could also have contributed 
to the CAR's turbulent political trajectory. Despite these differences, this 
article specifically focusses on a comparison of the experiences of party 
regulation in promoting constitutional democracy in both Senegal and CAR. 
3.1 CAR 
Formerly known as Oubangui Chari, the CAR is a landlocked country 
located in the centre of Africa, which became an independent state in 
August, 1960. From 1884 to 1960 the CAR had been colonised by the 
French, which had leased the country to private companies. The CAR law 
and its judicial institutions have been largely inspired by the French Model 
and mostly have their roots in the French civil law. Other sources of law 
complement the French style civil law. These are based on local traditions 
and customs practised by the various CAR communities. As regards its 
political trajectory, in the 1959 to 1991 phase of democratisation the CAR 
adopted five different constitutions and experienced five different regimes,35 
which included a period of constitutional monarchy, with three coups d'état. 
Like many other African countries, the CAR experienced a long period of a 
one-party system, which came to an end in the early 1990s, when most 
African states undertook a transition to multi-partyism.  
                                            
33  Senghor was peacefully replaced by his prime minister Abdou Diouf. 
34  In 1958, Barthélemy Boganda became Oubangui Chari's first prime minister and 
intended to serve as first president of independent CAR. However, he was 
mysteriously killed in 1959.  
35  Between 1959 and 1991 the CAR was successively led by Barthelemy Boganda 
(1958-1959); David Dacko (1960-1966); Jean-Bedel Bokassa (1966-1979); David 
Dacko (1979-1981); and Andre Kolingba (1981-1993). 
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3.1.1 Constitutional provisions on the status and rights of political parties 
The first Constitution of the newly created CAR was adopted in 1959 before 
the country attained independence. The Constitution set up a parliamentary 
system and provided for the rights and duties of political parties.36 Article 2 
of the 1959 Constitution – which was similar to Article 4 of the 1958 French 
Constitution – provided for the status of political parties and groups. When 
the 1959 Constitution was adopted, the main political party was the 
Mouvement pour l'Evolution Sociale en Afrique Noire (MESAN)37 which was 
founded by Oubangui-Chari's "founding father" Barthelemy Boganda in 
1949. Other political parties included the Rassemblement Democratique 
Africain (RDA),38 the French Section of the Workers' International (SFIO)39 
and the Mouvement Populaire Republicain (MPR).40 However, in reality, 
only MESAN party members were allowed to be candidates during the 
legislative elections of 5 April 1959 and MESAN won all the seats, including 
at regional level.41 The brief experience of multi-partyism of the newly 
independent country came abruptly to an end in December 1960 when the 
opposition party Mouvement pour l'Evolution Démocratique de l'Afrique 
Centrale (MEDAC) was formally prohibited, making the CAR a de facto 
single party state. On 21 December 1962 a law amending the Constitution 
was passed to formally prohibit multi-partyism and establish a one-party 
system in the CAR.42 With the 1962 constitutional amendment, the CAR 
formally moved from a multiparty system to a de jure one-party system, 
which would continue in existence for the next three decades.  
The third Constitution of 1976, which proclaimed the Central African Empire 
and established a constitutional monarchy under Emperor Jean-Bedel 
Bokassa, reiterated the position of MESAN as the sole political party of the 
country.43 However, the CAR experienced a brief period of multi-partysim 
when it adopted its fourth Constitution on 1 February 1981 under David 
                                            
36  Article 2 of the Constitution of the CAR, 1959. 
37  MESAN was founded in 1949 by CAR founding father Barthelemy Boganda. 
38  A federation of African political parties created during the Bamako Congress in 1946. 
39  A former French political party founded in 1905. In 1957 the federations of SFIO in 
African countries including Oubangui-Chari and Senegal decided to separate from 
the French parent organisation and set up a new Pan-African party called the African 
Socialist Movement (MSA).  
40  A former French Christian Democrat Party founded in 1944.  
41  Opposition candidate lists submitted in 3 constituencies were rejected due to 
"irregularities". See Kalck Barthélemy Boganda 218. 
42  Constitutional Law 62.365 of 1962. 
43  Articles 15 and 16 of the Constitution of the CAR, 1976. 
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Dacko.44 The 1981 Constitution explicitly allowed multi-partyism45 and as a 
result, multiparty presidential elections were held on 15 March 1981. 
However, the 1981 Constitution was suspended following a coup d'état in 
September 1981. In 1986 a new Constitution was adopted through a 
referendum46 and once again it endorsed a single-party system in the CAR. 
Article 3 of the 1986 Constitution stipulated that the single party 
Rassemblement Démocratique Centrafricain (RDC) “represented the 
people in its diversity and contributed to the promotion of the right to vote”. 
In summary, the general trend of party constitutionalisation before the 1990s 
in the CAR mostly aimed to establish a de jure one-party state. It was only 
when the sixth Constitution of the CAR was adopted in 1995 that the 
incorporation of multi-partyism was finally confirmed.47 From this point on, 
all subsequent CAR constitutions explicitly entrenched the rights and duties 
of political parties and also recognised the contribution of political parties to 
the country's political, economic and social life.48 For instance, Article 31 of 
the current Constitution of 2016 requires that political parties respect the 
gender and regional balance and that they should not represent any armed 
groups. The constitutionalisation of political parties in the CAR therefore 
reflects the country's realities and challenges.  
3.1.2 Legal provisions on the status and rights of political parties 
As stated above, there was no legal regulation of political parties in the CAR 
until 1991. Since the first CAR Constitution of 1959, political parties have 
always been regulated by the constitutions, especially those providing for a 
single-party system. However, in 1991, amidst pressure from civil society 
movements and the international community, President Andre Kolingba had 
to repeal the ban on multi-partyism by adopting the 1991 Organic Law on 
the formation, operation, financing and dissolution of Political Parties.49 The 
1991 Party Law was a turning point in CAR's political history, as it paved 
the way for the organisation of multi-party presidential elections, which took 
place in 1993. In 2005 the 1991 Party Law was replaced by a Presidential 
                                            
44  The Constitution of the CAR, 1981 adopted by referendum. Art 4 of the 1981 CAR 
Constitution states: "Political parties contribute to the expression of universal 
suffrage. They are formed and carry out their activities freely." 
45  Article 14 of the 1981 CAR Constitution states that political parties concur in the 
expression of universal suffrage. They can be formed and carry out their activities 
freely. 
46  Constitution of the CAR, 1986. 
47  Article 19 of the Constitution of the CAR, 1995. 
48  Article 20 of the Constitution of the CAR, 2004; art 31 of the Constitution of the CAR, 
2016. 
49  Law 91.004 on the Formation, Operation, Financing and Dissolution of Political 
Parties of 1991. 
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Ordinance relating to political parties and the statutes of the opposition in 
the CAR.50 The 2005 Ordinance defined the requirements for the creation, 
registration, coalition, suspension, dissolution, functioning and funding of 
political parties or party coalitions, as well as the status of opposition 
parties.51 With the 2005 Ordinance, for the first time, the law in the CAR 
made specific provisions for the protection of opposition parties. It should 
be noted that the participation of political parties in the electoral process 
was also supported by other laws, including the Electoral Code,52 which 
created the Independent Joint Electoral Commission.53 Overall, it is 
important to point out that after a long period of the existence of a de jure 
single-party system, CAR's first regulation of political pluralism occurred 
through the law (the 1991 Party Law). A multi-party system was enshrined 
in the CAR Constitution of 1995.  
3.2 Senegal 
Although the Portuguese were the first to explore Senegal in the mid-15th 
century, the country was colonised by the French, who initially used its 
territory as a point of departure for the Atlantic slave trade.54 Senegal 
occupied a special position over other French colonies in Africa. Its capital 
city, Dakar, was also the capital of French West Africa and became the 
centre from which the French governed and developed their West African 
colonies.55 Generally, the Senegalese legal system, like that of the CAR, is 
inspired by the French civil law, although it is also influenced by customary 
laws as well as Islamic law. In terms of civil and political rights, Senegal is 
regarded as a relatively peaceful country with a longstanding democratic 
tradition.56 Since its independence in 1960 the country has never 
                                            
50  Presidential Ordinance 05.007 of 2005 on Political Parties and Opposition Parties 
Statutes in the Central African Republic (ch V). 
51  Chapter V of Presidential Ordinance 05.007 of 2005 on Political Parties and 
Opposition Parties Statutes in the Central African Republic.  
52  Law 98.004 of 1998 amended by Law 99.015 of 1999 relating to the Electoral Code; 
Law 09.016 of 2009 relating to the Electoral Code; Law 13.003 of 2013 relating to 
the Electoral Code as aligned with Law 15.004 of 2015 derogating from certain 
provisions of Law 13.003 of 2013 and by Law 15.005 of 2015 amending certain 
provisions of Law 15.004 of 2015. 
53  Law 98.004 of 1998. 
54  Education Encyclopedia 2019 https://education.stateuniversity.com/pages/1309/ 
Senegal-HISTORY-BACKGROUND.html. 
55  Education Encyclopedia 2019 https://education.stateuniversity.com/pages/1309/ 
Senegal-HISTORY-BACKGROUND.html. 
56  With the exception of the political unrest around the organisation of the presidential 
elections in 2012. Despite popular opposition, the Constitutional Council validated 
the candidacy of incumbent President Abdoulaye Wade, while it invalidated the 
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experienced a coup d'état, and it has continuously consolidated its status 
as an example of good governance and constitutional democracy. 
3.2.1 Constitutional provisions on the status and rights of political parties 
Senegal already had a number of existing political parties before accessing 
independence. These included the Rassemblement Démocratique Africain 
(RDA), the French Section of the Workers' International (SFIO),57 and the 
Bloc Démocratique Sénégalais (BDS) founded in 1948 by Leopold Sedar 
Senghor, who became the first president of independent Senegal in 1960. 
In 1958 Senghor initiated the merger of other parties to form the Union 
Progressiste Sénégalaise (UPS),58 which became the most prominent 
political force in the country. The first constitutional regulation of political 
parties in Senegal occurred through the Constitution of 26 August 1960, 
which provided for Senegal's adherence to a parliamentary system. Article 
3 of the 1960 Constitution provided for the rights and duties of parties, while 
emphasising their obligations to respect the principles of sovereignty and 
democracy. In 1963 a new Constitution59 allowing a presidential system was 
adopted. Article 3 of the 1963 Constitution reiterated the provisions of the 
1960 Constitution concerning political parties' rights and duties.  
Theoretically, political pluralism had been implemented in Senegal before 
the country's independence and the rights of political parties were enshrined 
in the constitution as soon as Senegal became independent in 1960. 
However, in practice, both at national and local government level, President 
Leopold Sedar Senghor's party, Union Progressiste Sénégalaise (UPS), 
held all seats in Parliament,60 while other political parties were prohibited.61 
This contradicted the existing constitutional provisions on the rights and 
duties of all political parties in Senegal.62 In reality, the representation of the 
citizens of Senegal occurred solely through the ruling party. Between 1966 
and 1974, in violation of the Constitution, Senegal experienced an 
                                            
candidacy of other key figures. Several demonstrations broke out immediately after 
the announcement, leading to a dozen deaths. 
57  RDA and SFIO were also existing political parties in the CAR and other Francophone 
African countries.  
58  L'Union Progressiste Sénégalaise was created in 1958 and renamed Parti Socialiste 
in 1976. 
59  Constitutional Law 63-22 of 1963 on the amendment of the Constitution of the 
Republic of Senegal.  
60  During the 1963 presidential elections Senghor won by 99% of the votes. 
61  Cheikh Anta Diop's Bloc des Masses Sénégalaises (BMS) was banned in 1962; and 
BMS converted into Front National Sénégalais and was banned again in 1964. 
62  See art 3 of the Constitution of the Republic of Senegal, 1960.  
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"authoritarian presidential regime",63 and became a de facto one-party 
state64 with the predominance of the UPS. While there was no formal 
prohibition of political pluralism, opposition parties were either curtailed or 
merged65 with the ruling party. The constitutionalisation of political pluralism 
was therefore only symbolic. It was only in 1974, following a wave of political 
and social unrest, that the government authorised the creation of a second 
political party, namely the Parti Démocratique Sénégalais (PDS).66 
From 1963 until 2001, when a new Constitution was finally adopted, the 
constitutional status of political parties was changed on several occasions 
in accordance with the government's political visions.67 Firstly, in 1976 
Article 3 of the Constitution was amended to authorise only three political 
parties in Senegal.68 Article 3 of the Constitution provided that political 
parties could not be more than three in number and that they must represent 
different currents of thought. Secondly, in 1978 the Constitution was 
amended to establish a four-party system in Senegal and to explicitly list the 
four authorised types of party ideologies.69 From the foregoing, it became 
apparent that while officially adhering to the principle of constitutional 
democracy and political pluralism, Senegal had opted for a "controlled multi-
partysim" illustrated by restrictive constitutional provisions pertaining to the 
activities of political parties. The Senegalese Government argued that to 
prevent political anarchy resulting from the proliferation of political parties70 
it had to resort to a system that closely regulated the status of political 
parties.  
It was only in 1981, during a third constitutional amendment of the status of 
political parties, that Article 3 of the Constitution was amended to reinstate 
"absolute multi-partyism" in Senegal.71 The government justified this step 
based on its aim to "modernise the political regime, strengthen good 
                                            
63  Tine 1997 Les Classiques des Sciences Sociales 16. 
64  The Government then referred to a "unified party" (parti unifié) while the opposition 
critiqued the existence of a single party (parti unique). 
65  In 1966 the Parti du Regroupement Africain-Senegal merged with the ruling party 
UPS. 
66  The Parti Démocratique Sénégalais was founded by Abdoulaye Wade in 1974. 
67  Overall, between 1967 and 1999 the Senegalese Constitution of 1963 was amended 
20 times. Three constitutional amendments specifically concerned the status of 
political parties.  
68  Constitutional Law 76-01 of 19 March 1976 on the revision of the Constitution of the 
Republic of Senegal.  
69  Constitutional Law 78-60 of 1978. The four authorised ideologies were conservative; 
liberal; socialist and marxist-leninist or communist. 
70  Fall Textes Constitutionnels du Sénégal 102.  
71  Constitutional Law 81-16 of 1981. President Abdou Diouf reinstated a "multipartisme 
absolu" in Senegal. 
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governance and consolidate the rule of law and democracy." In 2016 the 
Senegalese Constitution was amended to provide more rights and 
protection to all political parties and independent candidates alike. 
Senegalese political parties were given a societal role in terms of "training 
of citizens, promotion of citizens' participation in national life and public 
affairs management".72 In a separate article the 2016 Constitutional 
Amendment enshrined the rights of opposition parties as well as those of 
the leader of the opposition.73 
In sum, it can be said that the first decade following Senegalese 
independence was marked by a de facto single-party system, in violation of 
the provisions of the 1960 Constitution. Using an ideology-based party 
constitutionalisation, Senegal opted for a prudent and gradual approach to 
the protection and promotion of the rights of all political parties. The 
adoption of such an approach may suggest that the primary goal of party 
constitutionalisation was not to promote constitutional democracy but rather 
to preserve political power.  
3.2.2 Legal provisions on the status and rights of political parties 
As the Senegalese government enshrined the status of political parties in 
its Constitutions, it simultaneously enacted laws relating to political 
parties.74 In 1964 the first Senegalese Party Law regulated political parties' 
participation in elections.75 However the Party Law had little influence on the 
enforcement of the rights and duties of political parties since in reality only 
the ruling party was authorised to operate in the country and opposition 
parties were either intimidated or banned.76 In 1976 Article 2 of the 1975 
Party Law77 was amended to list the three party ideologies authorised in the 
country.78 Referring to Article 3 of the Constitution, the amended Party Law 
required the three political parties to respectively subscribe to three listed 
                                            
72  Constitutional Law 2016-10 of 2016 (art 4). 
73  Article 58 of the Constitutional Law 2016-10 of 2016 states: "The Constitution 
guarantees political parties that oppose Government's policy, the right to oppose. 
The Constitution guarantees the opposition a status that enables it to carry out its 
functions. The law defines its status and sets out its rights and duties as well as 
those of the leader of the opposition". 
74  Political Parties Law 75-68 of 1975; Political Parties Law 81-17 of 1981; Political 
Parties Law 89-36 of 1989 amending Political Parties Law 81-17 of 1981. 
75  Hartmann 2010 Democratization 770. 
76  Following the 1963 elections, the ruling party UPS was holding all seats in Parliament 
and Cheikh Anta Diop's Front National Sénégalais was banned in 1964. 
77  Political Parties Law 75-68 of 1975. 
78  The three authorised ideologies were: liberal and democrat; socialist and democrat; 
Marxist-Leninist/communist ideologies. 
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ideologies, namely the liberal and democratic, the socialist and democratic, 
or the Marxist-Leninist/communist ideologies, or else they could face 
dissolution. This development was considered as uncommon in comparison 
with the prevalent one-party systems and military regimes in other parts of 
the continent.79 In 1981, after the Senegalese Constitution was amended to 
provide for "absolute multi-partyism",80 a Party Law81 was adopted to repeal 
the "three ideologies" requirement. It merely required political parties to 
comply with the principles of national sovereignty and democracy. Finally, 
in 1989 a law amending the 1981 Party Law established the conditions for 
the dissolution of political parties.82 
4 Other sources of regulations 
4.1 International regulations 
There are no specific international obligations requiring states parties to give 
a constitutional or legal status to political parties, but as members of the 
United Nations African states are bound by the UN Charter obligations, 
which include promoting human rights and fundamental freedoms.83 
Adherence to UN Treaty-based bodies and instruments and their 
subsequent human rights-focussed obligations should foster the protection 
of constitutional democracy, good governance, and respect for the rule of 
law.84 The rationale for international intervention in promoting party 
constitutionalisation is based on the premise that each country has the 
sovereign right to choose how to conduct its internal affairs. However, by 
adhering to the UN Charter and various international instruments, states 
agree to abide by a set of obligations and commitments to protect 
fundamental rights and freedoms including citizens' right to participate in 
their country's public affairs.85 The main international instruments regulating 
freedom of association and citizens' right to participate in public affairs are 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (hereafter UDHR) of 194886 and 
                                            
79  Hartmann 2010 Democratization 771.  
80  With Constitutional Law 81-16 of 1981, President Abdou Diouf reinstated a 
"multipartisme absolu" in Senegal. See Fall Textes Constitutionnels du Sénégal 102. 
81  Political Parties Law 81-17 of 1981. 
82  Political Parties Law 89-36 of 1989 amending Political Parties Law 81-17 of 1981. 
83  The purpose of the Charter of the United Nations (1945) includes the achievement 
of international cooperation by promoting and encouraging respect for human rights 
and fundamental freedoms (art 1(3)). 
84  International IDEA International Obligations for Elections vii. 
85  International IDEA International Obligations for Elections v. 
86  Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) (UDHR). Art 21: "(1) Everyone has 
the right to take part in the government of his country, directly or through freely 
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the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (hereafter ICCPR) 
of 1966.87 As in the UDHR, the ICCPR confirms the right to participate in 
the conduct of public affairs. Regarding political parties in particular, the 
Travaux préparatoires of the monitoring body of the ICCPR, the Human 
Rights Committee, states that political parties are called upon to function 
democratically in order to guarantee citizens' equal rights and opportunity 
to be elected and to participate in public affairs.88 
UN treaties and resolutions, as well as the related jurisprudence,89 therefore 
provide universal benchmarks for States Parties to promote constitutional 
democracy, good governance and respect for the rule of law. From this 
perspective, the concept of an "obligations-based approach" to international 
treaties has been promoted as a way of ensuring that political parties, civil 
society groups and ordinary citizens are able to "debate and apply 
obligations from the same perspective, nationally and internationally." The 
prospects for promoting party constitutionalisation would be strengthened 
by the adoption of the obligations-based approach, as all stakeholders 
would be able to defend their rights to participate in public affairs using 
international instruments that their state has committed itself to abide by. 
The adoption of this approach is confirmed by the fact that national 
constitutions often make specific reference to international and regional 
instruments, making them constitutionally binding.  
                                            
chosen representatives. (2) Everyone has the right of equal access to public service 
in his country." 
87  International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966) (ICCPR). Art 21: "(1) 
Everyone shall have the right to freedom of association with others, including the 
right to from and join trade unions for the protection of his interests. (2) No restriction 
may be placed on the exercise of this right other than those which are prescribed by 
law and which are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national 
security or public safety, public order (ordre public), the protection of public health or 
morals of the protection of the rights and freedoms of others … Art 25: Every citizen 
shall have the right and the opportunity … (a) To take part in the conduct of public 
affairs, directly or through freely chosen representatives. (b) To vote and to be 
elected at genuine periodic elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage 
and shall be held by secret ballot, guaranteeing the free expression of the will of the 
electors". 
88  Travaux préparatoires UN Doc CCPR/C/SR1509 GC25 para 52. 
89  For instance, see UN Human Rights Committee: Concluding Observations - Uganda 
UN Doc CCPR/CO/80/UGA (2004); UN Human Rights Committee: Concluding 
Observations - Equatorial Guinea CCPR/CO/79/GNQ (2004); UN Human Rights 
Committee: Concluding Observations - Rwanda UN Doc CCPR/C/RWA/CO/3 
(2009). 
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4.2 Regional and sub-regional regulations 
African regional institutions can contribute to the effective implementation of 
party constitutionalisation and the promotion of constitutional democracy. 
The African Union (hereafter AU) has put in place norms, standards and 
instruments to strengthen Africa's political and socio-economic integration 
and unity, including the promotion of democracy through the rule of law and 
constitutional order. For instance, the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples' Rights of 1981 (hereafter ACHPR) provides for freedom of 
association and citizens' right to participate freely in public affairs through 
chosen representatives,90 and Articles 10 and 11 of the Charter reiterate the 
language of international instruments pertaining to freedom of association 
and freedom of expression.91 The African Commission on Human and 
Peoples' Rights, which is the treaty body that monitors the implementation 
of the ACHPR, has ruled in favour of the protection and promotion of 
freedom of association and freedom of expression. It has called on States 
Parties to comply with national constitutions and promote political 
pluralism.92 Similarly, the AU Constitutive Act of 2000 enshrines the key 
principles of the African Union, including respect for democratic principles, 
human rights, the rule of law and good governance.93 The Constitutive Act 
functions as a cornerstone for the promotion of constitutionalism in Africa 
as it establishes a close relationship between democracy, human rights, the 
rule of law, and good governance.94 It requires States Parties to promote 
and protect human and people's rights in accordance with the African 
                                            
90  Articles 10(1) and 13(1) of the ACHPR. 
91  Article 10 of the ACHPR: "1. Every individual shall have the right to free association 
on provided that he abides by the law. 2. Subject to the obligation of solidarity 
provided for in Art. 29 no one may be compelled to join an association." Art 11 of the 
ACHPR: "Every individual shall have the right to assemble freely with others. The 
exercise of this right shall be subject only to necessary restrictions provided for by 
law in particular those enacted in the interest of national security, the safety, health, 
ethics and rights and freedoms of others." 
92  See International Pen (on behalf of Saro-Wira) v Nigeria 2000 AHRLR 212 (ACHPR 
1998) paras 107-110, which finds a violation of the right to freedom of association 
where the government takes action against an association because it does not 
approve of its positions. Also see Interights v Mauritania 2004 AHLRL 87 (ACPHR 
2004), in which the Commission found that the dissolution of a political party by the 
Islamic Republic of Mauritania was not proportional to the nature of the breaches 
and offences committed by the political party and was therefore in violation of the 
provisions of art 10(1) of the ACHPR. The African Commission went on to call on all 
the republican political forces in the Islamic Republic of Mauritania to work, within 
the framework of the Constitution, towards the reinforcement of healthy pluralist and 
democratic practice, which would preserve social unity and public peace. 
93  African Union Constitutive Act (2000) art 3(m). 
94  Mbata Mangu 2014 Africa Review 63. 
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Charter on Human and People's Rights and other relevant human rights 
agreements (Article 3(h)). 
The African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance (hereafter 
ACDEG) of 2007, which came into force in 2012, also aims to promote 
African States' adherence to the rule of law and good governance. It is one 
critical element of AU's agenda for constitutionalism and good governance, 
as it includes detailed provisions on human rights and the rule of law, 
democratic institutions, democratic elections; political, economic and social 
governance as well as mechanisms for its application at individual state 
party, regional and continental level.95 The major role played by political 
parties is highlighted, as Article 3(11) requires States Parties to reinforce 
political pluralism and recognise the role, rights and responsibilities of 
legally constituted political parties, including opposition political parties, 
which should be given a status under national law.96  
The effective promotion and protection of the constitutional rights and duties 
of political parties by individual states depends on whether or not they have 
ratified and domesticated the international or regional human rights 
framework. In other words, the CAR and Senegal would be legally bound 
by these human rights instruments if they have ratified them. However, both 
countries97 have not ratified the ACDEG. Hence it may be assumed that in 
reality the ACDEG and other non-binding AU frameworks98 may have a 
limited effect on CAR and Senegal. However, recent decisions by the 
African Court of Human and People's Rights have shown that the non-
ratification of regional instruments does not preclude AU member states 
from being legally bound and held accountable for the promotion of 
constitutional democracy and good governance. On two occasions99 the 
Court has ordered state parties to respectively amend their constitutions 
and laws in order to make them compliant with the above mentioned human 
rights instruments. In the case of Christopher R Mtikila and others v 
Republic of Tanzania in 2001, the African Court on Human and People's 
Rights found that a Tanzanian legislative ban on independent candidates 
                                            
95  Fombad "African Union and Democratization" 327. 
96  Article 3(11) of the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance (2007) 
(ACDEG). 
97  The CAR signed the ACDEG on 28 June 2008 while Senegal signed it on 12 
December 2008. 
98  For instance, the African Union Declaration on the Principles Governing Democratic 
Elections in Africa (2002). 
99  See Christopher R Mtikila v Republic of Tanzania Application 009/2011 and 
011/2011, Judgment of 14 June 2013; also see Actions pour la Protection des Droits 
de l'Homme v The Republic of Cote d'Ivoire Application 001/2014, Judgment of 18 
November 2016. 
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was unconstitutional. The ban violated the right to association – which 
includes the right not to associate, and the right to political participation 
guaranteed in the African Charter on Human and People's Rights. Similarly, 
in the case of ACPDH v The Republic of Côte d'Ivoire, the African Court 
ruled that by adopting an impugned law on the composition of the 
Independent Electoral Commission (IEC),100 the Republic of Côte d'Ivoire 
violated its commitment to establish an independent and impartial electoral 
body as provided under Article 17 of the African Charter on Democracy and 
Article 3 of the Economic Community of West African States (hereafter 
ECOWAS) Democracy Protocol.  
There are also sub-regional instruments which aim to promote constitutional 
democracy and the status of political parties. In West Africa ECOWAS101 
adopted a Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance in 2001. It 
recognises political parties' freedom of operation and guarantees the 
freedom of the opposition.102 The Protocol is used as a reference point for 
assessing West African states' compliance with the principles of democracy, 
good governance and the rule of law. For instance, in 2010, in the Hissein 
Habre case, the ECOWAS Community Court of Justice urged Senegal to 
ensure that its constitutional and legal reforms do not violate the claimant's 
rights to a fair trial.103 The Hissein Habre case demonstrated the impacts of 
ECOWAS mechanisms on ECOWAS countries' constitutional and legal 
frameworks and their obligations to comply with them. In Central Africa, the 
Preamble of the Revised Treaty for the Establishment of the Economic and 
Monetary Community of Central African States (hereafter CEMAC) of 2008 
proclaims member states' commitment to democratic values, the rule of law 
and good governance. The objectives of the CEMAC Treaty are reinforced 
by the Economic Community of Central African States (hereafter ECCAS) 
Treaty104 which also addresses issues related to human rights and 
democracy.105 However in reality there is no instrument in the Central 
African sub-region that specifically provides for democracy, good 
governance and respect for constitutionalism as in the ECOWAS zone. 
                                            
100  Law 2014-335 Relating to the Independent Electoral Commission, 2014. 
101  Senegal is a member of the ECOWAS. 
102  Article 1(i) of the Economic Community of West African States Protocol on 
Democracy and Good Governance (2001). 
103  Hissein Habré v Republic of Senegal Judgment No ECW/CCJ/JUD/06/10 of 18 
November 2010. The ECOWAS Community Court found that Senegal's reforms 
were likely to affect Chadian President Hissein Habre's human rights.  
104  Communaute Economique Des Etats de L' Afrique Centrale date unknown 
http://www.ceeac-eccas.org/images/traites/trt_eccas.pdf. Membership between 
CEMAC and ECCAS overlaps. 
105  The CAR is a member of CEMAC and ECCAS. 
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More specifically, Central African states have no sub-regional obligations to 
adopt constitutional and legal regulations on political parties.  
5 Justifications and rationale for regulating the status of 
political parties in CAR and Senegal 
The motivation for regulating the status of political parties varies according 
to the actors involved in the process, whether they are political parties 
themselves, the media, and civil society organisations or external actors, 
such as state or non-state international organisations. In Europe, for 
instance, Gabriela Borz explained the wave of party constitutionalisation 
around six main justifications,106 amongst which there is the need for the 
recognition of political parties as "agents" or representatives of the citizens 
in the political system. Party constitutionalisation therefore constitutes a 
legitimation of the role and activities of political parties in a constitutional 
democracy. Constitutional recognition is expected to place political parties 
in a more stable position so that they are less vulnerable to change. Another 
justification of party constitutionalisation pertains to political parties' need for 
resources and subsidies. Political parties need constitutional recognition to 
be able to obtain certain advantages with a view to ultimately guaranteeing 
their sustainability in the power structure. Finally, one of Gabriela Borz's 
justifications for party constitutionalisation originates in the necessity to 
regulate the activities of political parties by ensuring that they comply with 
the constitution. Party constitutionalisation would force political parties to 
comply with the principles of accountability and transparency even in their 
internal affairs. 
In the next section, a review of the current provisions regulating political 
parties in CAR and Senegal will confirm whether or not Gabriella Borz's 
rationale for party constitutionalisation is applicable in both countries. 
5.1 Promoting constitutional democracy  
In the CAR, Article 31 of the 2016 Constitution stipulates that political parties 
and political groups contribute to the expression of suffrage. Article 26 of 
the CAR Constitution of 2016 provides that institutions that are responsible 
for running the state hold their powers from the people by means of 
elections, through direct or indirect universal suffrage.107 Similarly, in 
Senegal the Preamble to the Constitution enshrines the country's desire to 
be a modern state. It recognises the opposition as a fundamental pillar of 
                                            
106  Borz 2016 IPSR 2. 
107  Constitution of the CAR, 2016. 
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democracy and an indispensable element for the proper functioning of the 
democratic mechanism. As the Senegalese Constitution was amended in 
2016, the new Article 4 of the same Constitution108 not only recognised the 
role of political parties and coalitions of political parties in the expression of 
suffrage but also emphasised that political parties contribute to training 
citizens, and to promoting their participation in national life and in the 
management of public affairs. The key role of political parties in the 
promotion of constitutional democracy in the CAR and Senegal is therefore 
recognisable in both countries' constitutions.  
Since constitutional democracy is characterised by the principle of popular 
sovereignty, in which citizens are seen as the ultimate source of the 
authority of the government, the running of elections constitutes a means 
by which it translates the free expression of the will of citizens into 
representative government.109 Overall, the CAR and Senegalese 
Constitutions provide for citizens' electoral rights in general terms, while 
recognising political parties' role in the electoral processes, and provides for 
the legislation to regulate the modalities of the electoral system of both 
countries. The recent amendment of the Senegalese Electoral Code is an 
example of the link between political parties, the conduct of national 
elections and the promotion of constitutional democracy. In April 2018 
members of the ruling party amended the Electoral Code110 in order to 
restrict the requirements for becoming a candidate in presidential elections. 
The Government justified this move through its willingness to rule out 
candidates with no chance of winning and therefore prevent political 
anarchy. This suggests that the Senegalese Government established a link 
between the number of political parties and candidates and the efficient 
conduct of elections in a constitutional democracy. However, it should be 
noted that the Senegalese government's reasoning contradicts the African 
Court's judgment in the above-mentioned Mtikila case, which recognised all 
citizens' right to political participation as guaranteed by the African Charter 
on Human and People's Rights. 
5.2 Regulating party funding  
Butler posits that money is essential to the operation of any democracy.111 
Money is not only essential to implementing national development policies 
and programmes but it is also a critical resource for political parties to 
                                            
108  Constitutional Law 2016-10 of 2016 on the Revision of the Constitution. 
109  International IDEA International Obligations for Elections 214. 
110  Law 2018-22 Amending the Electoral Code, 2018. 
111  Butler Paying for Politics 1. 
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operate, mainly by organising their campaigns, disseminating their 
alternative visions and policies and expanding the number of their voters.112 
Even though it is widely accepted that political parties require financing, it is 
also acknowledged that non-transparent financing may "discourage 
participation in political parties and encourage cynicism".113 Party funding 
regulation is therefore expected to promote citizens' trust in politics and 
political parties in particular but also to promote constitutional democracy as 
a whole.114  
In CAR Article 31 of the 2016 Constitution provides that a law determines 
the conditions of formation, operation and financing of political parties. 
Accordingly, the financing of political parties in CAR is regulated by a 
Presidential Ordinance of 2005,115 which provides for annual state funding 
of political parties proportionate to the number of their members of 
Parliament.116 In the context of elections, the state is required to support 
political parties' election expenses by reimbursing 50% of the authorised 
campaign expenses limit. However, it appears that in reality there have 
been no annual budget allocations to political parties in recent years in 
CAR.117 This suggests that the 2005 Ordinance on political parties has not 
been fully implemented and political parties in CAR do not have access to 
state funding, even though there is a legal framework in place. In Senegal 
the 2016 amendment to the Constitution stipulates that the conditions in 
which political parties carry out their activities and receive public funding 
should be determined by law.118 However, the existing Party Law of 1981119 
does not make provision for direct public funding.120 In other words, in 
Senegal the constitutional provisions on public funding are currently not 
being enforced, since there is no implementing legislation that sets out the 
modalities of direct state funding to political parties.  
It should be pointed out that the constitutions of the CAR and Senegal are 
both silent on the issue of private sources of funding to political parties. The 
                                            
112  Butler Paying for Politics 1. 
113  Bryan and Baer Money in Politics 7.  
114  International IDEA Funding of Political Parties and Election Campaigns 2. 
115  Presidential Ordinance 05.007 on Political Parties and Opposition Parties Statutes 
in the Central African Republic, 2005. 
116  Presidential Ordinance 05.007 on Political Parties and Opposition Parties Statutes 
in the Central African Republic, 2005 (art 44). 
117  The 2016 and 2017 CAR budget did not provide for state party funding: Droit Afrique 
2017 http://www.droit-afrique.com/uploads/RCA-LF-2017.pdf; Droit-Afrique 2016 
https://www.droit-afrique.com/uploads/RCA-LF-2016-.pdf. 
118  Constitutional Law 2016-10 of 2016 (art 4). 
119  Amended by Political Parties Law 89-36 of 1989. 
120  Article 5 of Political Parties Law 89-36 of 1989. 
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CAR Ordinance of 2005 authorises private sources of funding to political 
parties, provided that the donors are CAR nationals and the funds do not 
exceed 50% of the parties' total income.121 The Senegalese Party Law of 
1981 implicitly recognises the private funding of political parties' since it 
requires political parties to file their annual accounts with the Government, 
in order to establish that they do not benefit from prohibited resources such 
as foreign donations. However, the law does not explicitly include any 
regulation of the amount that may be received, or the modalities or the 
nature of these private contributions.  
Following the Senegalese presidential elections in February 2019, election 
observers including civil society122 and intergovernmental bodies123 
highlighted the absence of a legal framework related to political party and 
electoral campaign funding. For instance, in its conclusions on the 
presidential elections, the European Union Election Observation Mission in 
Senegal recommended the enactment of a political party funding law and 
the creation of an institution which would monitor compliance with the 
legislation and take enforcement measures accordingly.124 Using the 
example of the CAR and Senegal, it is important to highlight the risk of not 
regulating or implementing party financing. The regulation of party funding 
is essential to protect political parties' from corruption or bankruptcy and 
therefore to promote constitutional democracy.  
5.3 Regulating the activities and behaviour of political parties  
Some African countries' constitutions have included provisions requiring 
political parties to abide by the democratic principles of good governance 
and national sovereignty.125 The regulation of internal party democracy may 
concern party nominations, leadership appointments and internal decision-
making, as well as regional and gender representation.  
In the CAR, under Article 31 of the 2016 Constitution political parties are 
required to promote and respect the principles of democracy, national unity 
and sovereignty, human rights and the republican nature of the State in 
                                            
121  Article 42 of Presidential Ordinance 05.007 on Political Parties and Opposition 
Parties Statutes in the Central African Republic, 2005. 
122  Sunu Election 2019. 
123  European Union Election Observation Mission in Senegal.  
124  Union Européenne Sénégal 2019 11. 
125  For instance, see Constitution of Rwanda, 2015 (art 56); Constitution of Kenya, 2010 
(art 91); Constitution of Nigeria, 1999 (art 223). In South Africa, the Constitution does 
not include specific provisions pertaining to political parties' behaviour and internal 
affairs. However, the Electoral Commission Act 51 of 1996 provides for the condition 
of registration of political parties (ss 15-17).  
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accordance with the existing laws and regulations. Political parties are also 
required to respect the principle of gender and regional representation. 
Pursuant to the Constitution, a Law on Gender Parity126 was adopted in 
2016. It provides that political parties' decision-making processes that do 
not involve 35% of women can be invalidated by a statutory body under 
Article 8. The law also provides for the creation of a monitoring body to that 
effect. In Senegal, in addition to the obligation to abide by the principles of 
democracy, national sovereignty and unity, Article 4 of the Constitution 
explicitly stipulates that political parties are required "to strictly observe the 
rules of associative good governance" or else they would face sanctions 
that might lead to their suspension and dissolution. In 2008 the Senegalese 
Parliament amended the Constitution in order to ensure that political parties 
comply with the requirement of gender equality.127 It can be said that in the 
CAR and Senegal, both the constitutional designers and lawmakers have 
made provision for the enforcement of internal party democracy. The 
provision requiring internal democracy relates specifically to the countries' 
move to ensure that political parties themselves comply with democratic 
principles in the conduct of their internal affairs.  
6 Gaps in and challenges to party regulation 
The examples of party regulation in CAR and Senegal indicate that for an 
effective promotion of constitutional democracy, regulation must be followed 
by implementation. For instance, in the case of state party funding in the 
CAR, despite the existence of a Presidential Ordinance,128 in reality there 
have been no annual budget allocations to political parties in recent 
years.129 It may be argued that the current conflict situation in the country 
could explain this shortcoming. However, it appears that state party funding 
was not allocated during the period prior to the conflict; that is, before 
2013.130 Consequently, political parties in the CAR do not have access to 
state funding even though there is an appropriate legal framework in place. 
Equally, in Senegal the 2016 constitutional provisions on public funding are 
                                            
126  Law 16.004 Establishing Parity between Men and Women in the Central African 
Republic, 2016. 
127  Constitutional Law 2008-30 of 2008 amending arts 7, 63, 68, 71, and 82 of the 
Constitution.  
128  Presidential Ordinance 05.007 on Political Parties and Opposition Parties Statutes 
in the Central African Republic, 2005. 
129  The 2016 and 2017 CAR budget did not provide for state party funding: Droit Afrique 
2017 http://www.droit-afrique.com/uploads/RCA-LF-2017.pdf; Droit-Afrique 2016 
https://www.droit-afrique.com/uploads/RCA-LF-2016-.pdf. 
130  For instance, see the 2011 CAR budget, which does not include specific budget 
allocation to political parties: Droit-Afrique 2011 http://www.droit-
afrique.com/upload/doc/rca/RCA-LF-2011.pdf. 
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currently not being enforced since there is no implementing legislation that 
sets out the modalities of direct state funding to political parties. Similar legal 
gaps apply to the situation of the foreign funding of political parties in the 
CAR and Senegal. In the CAR, the Political Parties Ordinance of 2005 
provides that foreign donations should not exceed 20% of the parties' total 
income,131 while in Senegal the 1989 law amending the 1981 Party Law 
provides for the dissolution of political parties where a party has received 
funding directly or indirectly from foreigners or foreigners established in 
Senegal. However, none of the above-mentioned laws include monitoring 
mechanisms making the flow of foreign funding hardly preventable. This 
suggests that the regulation of political parties in the CAR and Senegal is 
symbolic, to some extent, and that the promotion of constitutional 
democracy may not be effective.  
Another risk to party regulation is the attempt of governments to restrict 
political parties’ activities, as was seen in the 1960s in Senegal, when the 
government opted for a "controlled multi-partyism" by limiting the number of 
authorised political parties. The promotion of constitutional democracy 
would be compromised if the regulation of political parties enabled any 
ruling party to pose a potential threat to genuine multi-partyism. Party 
regulation would become a source of limited competition and the ruling 
party's monopoly of power would imply that there would be little chance of 
political alternation. 
7 Conclusion and recommendations 
This study had two main objectives. The first was to review the emergence 
and evolution of party regulation in CAR and Senegal, in the light of their 
respective historical backgrounds and socio-political contexts. The second 
objective was to establish whether the constitutional and legal regulation of 
political parties in both countries has actually promoted constitutional 
democracy to which CAR and Senegal have adhered since the 1990s. 
These two objectives are essential in understanding the current position of 
political parties in both countries, and the role that they play in the 
constitutional order.  
Party constitutionalisation emerged in CAR and Senegal as they became 
independent. It was established that the French legal framework, 
specifically the French Constitution of 1958, played a crucial role in the 
                                            
131  Article 41 of the Presidential Ordinance 05.007 on Political Parties and Opposition 
Parties Statutes in the Central African Republic, 2005. 
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process of party constitutionalisation in CAR and Senegal. It is submitted 
that the legal regulation of political parties in the CAR and Senegal has 
complemented and strengthened the process of party constitutionalisation, 
regardless of the democratic or undemocratic nature of the regimes. It is 
also argued that party regulation can play a significant role in promoting 
constitutional order and political stability. Senegal's legal and constitutional 
regulation of political parties may have contributed to its long history of 
democracy and political stability compared with that of the CAR, which has 
been in political turmoil. For instance, the constitution of Senegal recognised 
unrestricted multi-partyism132 from as early as 1981. Meanwhile, the CAR 
was a de jure one-party state from 1962 to 1991. During this period the 
country experienced three coups d'état.133  
In examining the justifications of and rationale for party regulation, the issue 
of the implementation of the constitutional and legal regulation of political 
parties has been highlighted. This is because it was found that the 
regulation of political parties constituted a means for ensuring that they 
comply with the principles of accountability, good governance and 
transparency, even in their internal affairs. For instance, the state funding 
of political parties in CAR and Senegal is still "symbolic", even though the 
Senegalese Constitution explicitly provides for such a resource. This raises 
the issue of "semantic constitutions" that are not enforced in practice and 
subsequently jeopardise the promotion of constitutional democracy. 
In this light, it is recommended that constitutional and legal regulation are 
complemented by constitutionally recognised enforcement mechanisms 
which can protect and promote the constitutional rights and duties of political 
parties and clearly impact on the position of political parties in the 
constitutional democracy. Similarly, it is important that the private funding of 
political parties is constitutionally regulated. In CAR and Senegal only party 
laws provide for the private funding of political parties, but in reality there 
are no monitoring and sanction mechanisms.  
Finally, party constitutionalisation highlights the essential role of the 
judiciary in protecting and promoting the constitutional order. An 
independent judiciary is expected to protect the constitutional rights and 
duties of all political parties regardless of whether they are majority or 
                                            
132  In Senegal, multi-partyism was initially limited to three authorised political parties 
(1976), then four political parties (1978). 
133  1966, 1979 and 1981. 
S VOHITO-ANYANWU PER / PELJ 2020 (23)  26 
minority parties. In the CAR134 and Senegal135 current frameworks for 
constitutional review there are restrictive rules for accessing the 
constitutional courts, making it almost impossible for ordinary litigants, 
including opposition political parties, to refer any matter pertaining to the 
rights and duties of political parties to the constitutional judge. A framework 
in which independent constitutional judges have significant latitude in 
interpreting and protecting constitutional provisions would probably be more 
conducive to the effective implementation of party rights and the promotion 
of constitutional democracy. 
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Mbata Mangu 2014 Africa Review  
Mbata Mangu A "The African Union and the Promotion of Democracy and 
Good Political Governance under the African Peer-Review Mechanism: 10 
Years on" 2014 Africa Review 59-72 
Tine 1997 Les classiques des Sciences Sociales 
Tine A "De l'un au multiple et vice-versa?: Essai sur le Multipartisme au 
Sénégal (1974-1996)" 1997 Les classiques des Sciences Sociales 1-74 
Van de Walle 2003 J Mod Afr Stud 
Van de Walle N "Presidentialism and Clientelism in Africa's Emerging Party 
Systems" 2003 J Mod Afr Stud 297-321 
Union Européenne Sénégal 2019  
Union Européenne Mission d’observation électorale de l’Union européenne: 
Sénégal 2019 - Rapport final Election Présidentielle 24 février 2019 
(Mission d'observation électorale de l'Union Européenne Dakar 2019) 
Case law 
Actions pour la Protection des Droits de l'Homme v The Republic of Cote 
d'Ivoire Application 001/2014, Judgment of 18 November 2016 
S VOHITO-ANYANWU PER / PELJ 2020 (23)  29 
Christopher R Mtikila v Republic of Tanzania Application 009/2011 and 
011/2011, Judgment of 14 June 2013 
Hissein Habré v Republic of Senegal Judgment No ECW/CCJ/JUD/06/10 of 
18 November 2010 
Interights v Mauritania 2004 AHLRL 87 (ACPHR 2004) 
International Pen (on behalf of Saro-Wira) v Nigeria 2000 AHRLR 212 
(ACHPR 1998) 
United Democratic Movement v Speaker of the National Assembly 2017 5 
SA 300 (CC)  
Legislation 
Constitution of the CAR, 1959 
Constitution of the CAR, 1976 
Constitution of the CAR, 1981 
Constitution of the CAR, 1986 
Constitution of the CAR, 1995 
Constitution of the CAR, 2004 
Constitution of the CAR, 2016 
Constitutional Law 62.365 of 1962 
Law 98.004 of 1998 (Electoral Code) 
Law 99.015 of 1999 
Law 09.016 of 2009 
Law 13.003 of 2013 
Law 15.004 of 2015 
Law 15.005 of 2015 
Law 91.004 on the Formation, Operation, Financing and Dissolution of 
Political Parties of 1991 
S VOHITO-ANYANWU PER / PELJ 2020 (23)  30 
Law 16.004 Establishing Parity between Men and Women in the Central 
African Republic, 2016 
Presidential Ordinance 05.007 on Political Parties and Opposition Parties 
Statutes in the Central African Republic, 2005 
Côte d'Ivoire 
Law 2014-335 Relating to the Independent Electoral Commission, 2014 
Kenya 
Constitution of Kenya, 2010 
Nigeria 
Constitution of Nigeria, 1999 
Rwanda 
Constitution of Rwanda, 2015 
Senegal 
Constitution of the Republic of Senegal, 1960 
Constitution of the Republic of Senegal, 2001 
Constitutional Law 63-22 of 1963 
Constitutional Law 76-01 of 1976 
Constitutional Law 78-60 of 1978 
Constitutional Law 81-16 of 1981 
Constitutional Law 2008-30 of 2008 
Constitutional Law 2016-10 of 2016  
Law 2018-22 Amending the Electoral Code, 2018 
Political Parties Law 75-68 of 1975 
Political Parties Law 81-17 of 1981 
S VOHITO-ANYANWU PER / PELJ 2020 (23)  31 
Political Parties Law 89-36 of 1989  
South Africa 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 
Electoral Commission Act 51 of 1996 
International instruments 
African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance (2007) 
African Charter on Human and People's Rights (1981) 
African Union Constitutive Act (2000) 
African Union Declaration on the Principles Governing Democratic Elections 
in Africa (2002) 
Charter of the United Nations (1945) 
Economic Community of West African States Protocol on Democracy and 
Good Governance (2001) 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966) 
Revised Treaty for the Establishment of the Economic and Monetary 
Community of Central African States (2008) 
Travaux préparatoires UN Doc CCPR/C/SR1509 GC25 
UN Human Rights Committee: Concluding Observations - Equatorial 
Guinea CCPR/CO/79/GNQ (2004)  
UN Human Rights Committee: Concluding Observations - Rwanda UN Doc 
CCPR/C/RWA/CO/3 (2009) 
UN Human Rights Committee: Concluding Observations - Uganda UN Doc 
CCPR/CO/80/UGA (2004) 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) 
S VOHITO-ANYANWU PER / PELJ 2020 (23)  32 
Internet sources 
Centre for Civic Education date unknown http://www.civiced.org/ 
resources/publications/resource-materials/390-constitutional-democracy 
Centre for Civic Education date unknown Constitutional Democracy 
http://www.civiced.org/resources/publications/resource-materials/390-
constitutional-democracy accessed 30 May 2018 
Communaute Economique Des Etats de L' Afrique Centrale date unknown 
http://www.ceeac-eccas.org/images/traites/trt_eccas.pdf 
Communaute Economique Des Etats de L' Afrique Centrale date unknown 
Traite Instituant la Communaute Economique Des Etats de L' Afrique 
Centrale http://www.ceeac-eccas.org/images/traites/trt_eccas.pdf 
accessed 16 May 2018 
Dallas Learning Cloud date unknown https://dlc.dcccd.edu/usgov1-1/the-
meaning-of-democracy 
Dallas Learning Cloud date unknown The Meaning of Democracy 




Droit-Afrique 2011 République Centrafricaine Budget de l'Etat pour l'Année 
2011 http://www.droit-afrique.com/upload/doc/rca/RCA-LF-2011.pdf 
accessed 10 August 2018 
Droit-Afrique 2016 https://www.droit-afrique.com/uploads/RCA-LF-2016-
.pdf 
Droit-Afrique 2016 République Centrafricaine Budget de l'Etat pour l'Année 
2016 https://www.droit-afrique.com/uploads/RCA-LF-2016-.pdf accessed 
10 August 2018 
Droit Afrique 2017 http://www.droit-afrique.com/uploads/RCA-LF-2017.pdf 
Droit-Afrique 2017 République Centrafricaine Budget de l'Etat pour l'Année 
2017 http://www.droit-afrique.com/uploads/RCA-LF-2017.pdf accessed 10 
August 2018 
Education Encyclopedia 2019 https://education.stateuniversity.com/pages 
/1309/Senegal-HISTORY-BACKGROUND.html 
Education Encyclopedia 2019 Senegal – History and Background 
https://education.stateuniversity.com/pages/1309/Senegal-HISTORY-
BACKGROUND.html accessed 21 September 2019 
S VOHITO-ANYANWU PER / PELJ 2020 (23)  33 
Freedom House 2018 https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-
world/2018/central-african-republic 
Freedom House 2018 Freedom in the World 2018: Central African Republic 
https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2018/central-african-
republic accessed 21 September 2019 
Freedom House 2018 https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-
world/2018/senegal 
Freedom House 2018 Freedom in the World 2018: Senegal 
https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2018/senegal accessed 21 
September 2019 
Freedom House 2019 https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-
world/2019/senegal 
Freedom House 2019 Freedom in the World 2019: Senegal 
https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2019/senegal accessed 21 
September 2019 
Freedom House 2019 https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-
world/freedom-world-2018 
Freedom House 2019 Freedom in the World 2018: Democracy in Crisis 
https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2018 
accessed 1 June 2018 
Van Biezen 2009 http://www.partylaw.leidenuniv.nl/uploads/wp0309a.pdf 
Van Biezen I 2009 Constitutionalizing Party Democracy: The Constitutive 
Codification of Political Parties in Post-war Europe 
http://www.partylaw.leidenuniv.nl/uploads/wp0309a.pdf accessed 8 
October 2019 
List of Abbreviations 
ACDEG African Charter on Democracy, Elections and 
Governance 
ACHPR African Charter on Human and Peoples' 
Rights 
AHRLJ African Human Rights Law Journal 
Am J Comp L American Journal of Comparative Law 
AU African Union 
BDS Bloc Démocratique Sénégalais 
BMS Bloc des Masses Sénégalaises 
Br J Polit Sci British Journal of Political Science 
S VOHITO-ANYANWU PER / PELJ 2020 (23)  34 
CAR Central African Republic 
CEMAC Economic and Monetary Community of 
Central African States 
ECCAS Economic Community of Central African 
States 
ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States 
ICCPR International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights 
IEC Independent Electoral Commission 
International IDEA International Institute for Democracy and 
Electoral Assistance 
IPSR International Political Science Review 
J Mod Afr Stud Journal of Modern African Studies 
JLS Journal of Legislative Studies 
MEDAC Mouvement pour l'Evolution Démocratique 
de l'Afrique Centrale 
MESAN Mouvement pour l'Evolution Sociale en 
Afrique Noire 
MPR Mouvement Populaire Republicain 
MSA African Socialist Movement 
PDS Parti Démocratique Sénégalais 
RDA Rassemblement Démocratique Africain 
RDC Rassemblement Démocratique Centrafricain 
SFIO French Section of the Workers' International 
UDHR Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
UN United Nations 
UPS Union Progressiste Sénégalaise 
VRÜ Verfassung und Recht in Übersee / Law and 
Politics in Africa, Asia, Latin America 
 
